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1Personal Data Trading Scheme for Data Brokers in
IoT Data Marketplaces
Hyeontaek Oh, Sangdon Park, Gyu Myoung Lee, Hwanjo Heo, and Jun Kyun Choi,
Abstract—With the widespread use of IoT, data-driven services
take the lead of both online and offline businesses. Especially,
personal data draw heavy attention to service providers because
of usefulness in value-added services. With the emerging big-
data technology, a data broker appears, which exploits and sells
personal data about individuals to other third parties. Due to
little transparency between providers and brokers/consumers,
people think the current ecosystem is not trustworthy; and
new regulations with strengthening the rights of individuals
were introduced. Therefore, people have an interest in their
privacy valuation. In this sense, the willingness-to-sell (WTS)
of providers becomes one of the important aspects for data
brokers; however, conventional studies have mainly focused on
the willingness-to-buy (WTB) of consumers. Therefore, this paper
proposes an optimized trading model for data brokers which
buy personal data with proper incentives based on the WTS,
and they sell valuable information from the refined dataset by
considering the WTB and the dataset quality. This paper shows
that the proposed model has a global optimal point by the convex
optimization technique and proposes a gradient ascent based
algorithm. Consequently, it shows that the proposed model is
feasible even if data brokers spend costs to gather personal data.
Index Terms—Data brokers, Profit Maximization, Willingness-
to-buy, Willingness-to-sell
I. INTRODUCTION
As data-driven services and applications take the lead of
both online and offline businesses, data have become ubiq-
uitous and are now considered as new oil for the emerging
fourth industrial revolution, as a new valuable asset and
an indispensable driving force. Accordingly, data are wildly
overwhelming in not only its volume but also its diversity due
to a number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices have rapidly
increased [1]. It becomes hard to search, discover, process,
and analyze the proper data from the whole. As a result, the
big-data technology has emerged to find the true value of the
data.
With the emerging big-data technology, a data broker (also
called an information broker or an information reseller) ap-
pears, which collects, analyzes, and sells data about individuals
(i.e., data providers), to other third parties (i.e., data con-
sumers) [2], [3]. Especially, personal data (any information
relating to an identified or identifiable individual) are the main
target for data brokers because it can be used to value-added
services for customers (e.g., customization, recommendation,
etc.) [4], [5]. Data brokers gather personal data from various
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IoT devices (e.g., sensors, smartphones, or wearable devices)
and service providers (e.g., social network services, calendars,
or mails, etc.) and perform big-data analytics to extract new
information and knowledge. And then, they sell reproduced
information to many other third party services to improve
service quality (e.g., potential customer detection, identity
verification, fraud detection, etc. [2]).
Because more personal data result in more revenue, data
brokers try to collect personal data from IoT environment as
much as possible. Even though data brokers provide terms
and conditions for privacy as opt-in based agreement (or
consent), data providers (i.e., data subjects which provide their
personal data) have no chance to know how their personal
data are processed, delivered, and used. According to the
survey [6], 67% of the respondents said that organizations,
companies and agencies ask for too much personal information
online. Moreover, less than 40% of the respondents trust online
business actors (e.g., search engine companies, social network
service providers, online marketers and advertisers). Many
people think the current personal data ecosystem has various
risks and is not trustworthy because the current personal data
market has little transparency between data providers and
data brokers/data consumers [6], [7]. These kinds of little
transparent environments discourage data providers to share
or sell any personal data to the market.
On the other hand, many studies (e.g., literature in behavior
economics [8]–[11]) show that people also have an interest in
valuation of their privacy with proper incentives or benefits
[12]–[14]. This behavior is also considered as the concept
of willingness-to-sell (WTS) personal data (or willingness-
to-accept offered price from data brokers). According to the
survey [10], individuals are willing to share personal data for
deals and better customer services. In addition, Grossklags
and Acquisit investigated that the average number of people
with WTS their personal data is dramatically higher than
the average of people with willingness-to-protect them [12].
Moreover, Benndorf and Normann studied a incentive based
WTS personal data based on an assessment of individuals
[13]. This study showed cumulative distribution of the WTS
personal data of individuals in a social network service.
However, conventional studies have mainly focused on the
relationship between data brokers and data consumers. Many
studies only consider WTB of data consumers for provided
services (i.e., willingness-to-pay for services of data brokers),
and data providers are not well-considered because the current
personal data market environment is mainly controlled by
data brokers and third party consumers [15], [16]. However,
according to reports [8]–[11], a data provider’s perspective
2is also important and should be well-considered for future
personal data market development. Consequentially, the WTS
of data providers is one of the important aspects, but, only
few studies have considered the WTS of data providers for
the data market in the field of engineering.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel personal data
trading model in which a data broker buys multiple types
of personal data from data providers by providing proper
incentives based on privacy awareness and WTS of each
personal data type through IoT interfaces; and the data broker
sells valuable information from refined personal data as a
service to data consumers by considering WTB and quality of
gathered personal dataset. We consider that data providers have
WTS of each personal data type, and they sell their personal
data if and only if their WTS are satisfied. Similarly, data
consumers also decide to buy personal data based on proposed
prices and their WTB. The contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
‚ This paper designs a personal data trading model for data
brokers in IoT data marketplace with multiple types of
personal data (e.g., physical location, brand preferences,
purchase histories, etc.) from IoT environment by consid-
ering economic benefits of personal data providers as well
as satisfaction of personal data consumers. Specifically, in
order to satisfy requirements of each market participant,
this paper considers not only WTB of the consumers but
also WTS of the providers.
‚ The proposed WTS is designed based on a real-world
experience performed in [13] with different privacy
awareness factors because people feel different privacy
violations depending on personal data types. The pro-
posed WTB is also designed based on literature [17] to
reflect real-world behaviors.
‚ This paper also proposes a personal data quality model
for the collection of heterogeneous types of personal
data by considering correlations of multiple personal data
types as well as quantity of personal dataset based on
literature [18] related to personal data pricing factors. The
correlation of multiple personal data types is important
to measure quality of personal dataset because when
personal data is combined with other personal data, per-
sonal data providers can potentially be identified through
additional processing. It means personal data consumers
are able to create more value with personal dataset by
targeting proper stakeholders for their business.
‚ This paper models a profit maximization problem with
expected revenue and cost by considering WTB and
WTS, respectively. It also shows that the objective func-
tion of the proposed profit maximization problem is con-
cave. Based on the concaveness, the multivariate gradient
ascent (MGA) algorithm is proposed to find the global
maximum point. With some numerical and experimental
analysis, this paper also shows the proposed personal data
trading model is feasible to real-world applications.
With the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
paper which mathematically solves the profit maximization
problem of a data broker by jointly considering both WTS of
personal data providers and WTB of personal data consumers
in IoT data marketplaces. This paper shows that the proposed
personal data trading model is feasible even if a data broker
spends costs to gather personal data from providers, which
implies that personal data providers can actively participate in
the IoT data market for their own benefits.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces previous works regarding the data market and
pricing schemes for privacy. Section III presents an overview
of the proposed personal data trading model with the proposed
WTS, WTB, and personal data quality models. Section IV
formulates a profit function of a data broker satisfying both
WTS and WTB and solves the profit maximization problem.
Section V shows some numerical and experimental results
including analysis based on a real-world dataset, and Section
VI discusses the feasibility of the proposed model in detail.
Finally, this paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Data market and data trading issues have recently motivated
studies to maximize revenues and profits of data brokers
(or data service providers) while satisfying data consumers
(i.e., data buyers) [19]–[26]. Specifically, various data market
structures for data trading like monopoly market, oligopoly
market, and strong competition market were introduced in
[19]. Niyato et al. proposed a simple data market model for
IoT environments [20]. This study considered WTB of data
consumers depending on data quality. Zhao et al. proposed a
machine learning based privacy-preserved data trading market
with blockchain for preventing single-point-failure [21]. Yu
et al. proposed a mobile data trading model based on the
prospect theory in behavior economics to trade mobile data as
quantity between mobile users by considering data demands
and demand uncertainty [22]. Al-Fagih et al. proposed a
data pricing scheme for public sensing framework considering
delay, quality of services, and trust factors [23]. Competitive
data markets also have been studied. Jang et al. modeled a
data market with multiple independent data sources in IoT
environments [24]. In this model, a data service provider
(i.e., a data broker) has limited budget to buy data from all
data sources with the non-cooperative data trading model.
This paper showed the existence and the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium for the proposed trading model. Jiao et al.
proposed an auction based data trading model between a data
service provider and data consumers [25]. Hui et al. proposed
a sensing service system considering utilities of data providers
and data service providers with a data pricing scheme in
vehicle sensor networks [26]. However, these studies did not
consider behaviors of data providers and/or characteristics of
personal data which are important factors in personal data
brokering/analytic services.
In a personal data ecosystem, people have different privacy
concerns regarding personal data types (i.e., less private or
more private), so privacy awareness should be considered for
the personal data market [27], [28]. Personal data markets
and valuations of privacy (i.e., personal data pricing or pri-
vacy pricing models) have also been studied [18], [28]–[33].
3Malgieri and Custers investigated that the monetary value of
personal data can be quantified with various personal data
pricing factors [18]. Gkatzelis et al. proposed a bundle based
personal data trading scheme with the linear pricing model
[29]. Shen et al. also proposed a linear function based the per-
sonal data pricing scheme by considering information entropy,
credit of data providers, and data reference index [30]. Xu et
al. proposed a dynamic personal data pricing scheme using the
multi-armed bandit approach under privacy-preserved personal
data environments [31]. This paper modeled a cumulative
distribution of willingness-to-accept proposed price to buy
personal data (i.e., WTS) of data providers as simple counting
(i.e., in viewpoint of a data broker, the number of successful
data gathering divided by total number of requests.). Wang
et al. proposed a query based data pricing scheme [32]. In
this paper, the data pricing scheme modeled for approximate
aggregate queries from data consumers by considering pricing
points from data sellers and the accuracy of query results. In
addition, there are few studies tackled the personal data market
with data providers’ (or data owners’) incentives. Li and
Raghunathan proposed a incentive-compatible mechanism for
data owners to price and disseminate their private data based
on the privacy sensitivity level [28]. Parra-Arnau investigated
the trade-off between privacy and money of data providers
and proposed an optimization model for profile-disclosure risk
and economic reward [33]. Su et al. proposed a incentive
based crowd sourcing scheme for collecting various data in
cyber-physical-social systems [34]. It also proposed an auction
based price bidding scheme for data providers. The authors in
[28], [33], [34] only considered the relationship between data
providers and data brokers.
In this paper, to maximize profit of a data broker, we jointly
consider WTS of personal data providers as well as WTB
of personal data consumers with different privacy awareness
factors and personal data quality, respectively.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
This section describes a personal data trading model. We
consider a IoT data market consisting of three groups that
behave for their own benefits:
‚ GP “ tω1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ωNu, a group of candidates who may
provide their own personal data;
‚ dB , a single data broker who processes personal data and
provides it as a service;
‚ GS “ tτ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , τMu a group of candidates who may
subscribe a service from the data broker.
This market handles K personal data types (e.g., gender,
location, e-mail, purchase history, etc.). The overview of the
proposed personal data trading model is described in Figure
1.
Normally, the data broker obtains opt-in based agreement
for personal data collection from each personal data provider,
and then the data broker continuously gathers personal data
based on the agreement. This paper models that the data broker
buys personal data from the providers under the subscription-
based model with unit prices c “ pc1, c2, ..., ckq (i.e., each
personal data type k has the unit price ck.). The providers
Pay R
~ M ? ???? WTB (?)
(Revenue)
Buy
personal dataset
with price ??
Data
broker
Maximize profit U
= Maximize (Revenue – Cost)
Data providers (N)
?
Generate K types of personal data
Sell ? types 
of personal data
with price
? ? ???? ??? ? ? ???
Pay E
~ N ? ? ? WTS (?)
(Cost)
Data consumers (M)
?
Fig. 1. The proposed personal data trading model with multiple types in the
IoT data market
TABLE I
MAJOR SYMBOLS
Symbols Definition
K Number of personal data types in the market
ck Cost of each personal data type k P K
c Cost vector for all personal data types tc1, c2, ..., cku
ρk Privacy awareness factor of each personal data type k P K
N Number of personal data providers
Φ The provider’s willingness-to-sell function
M Number of personal data consumers
ps Subscription fee of each personal data consumer
Ψ The consumer’s willingness-to-buy function
U Profit function of the data broker
Q Personal data quality function
r Correlations between different personal data types
sell personal data to the data broker based on their own WTS,
and each personal data type has different WTS. On the other
hand, personal data consumers buy personal data from the data
broker based on their own WTB. Then, the expected profit U
is decided by expected revenue and cost depending on WTB
and WTS, respectively. Table I lists major symbols in this
paper for the convenience of readers.
A. Willingness-to-sell of data provider
First, the following real-valued random variable of kth
personal data type should be defined in order to provide a
well-defined WTS function of the data provider.
Definition 1 (Limit Selling Price of Data Provider). Let ω
be an arbitrary candidate in GP , who may provide their own
personal data (ω P GP ). A random variable Xk, called a limit
selling price of kth personal data type, is defined by the limit
price at which ω decides to sell the kth personal data type.
4TABLE II
PRIVACY AWARENESS FROM [27]
Age group Age group Age group
Personal data types 18 to 24 35 to 48 68 above
Credit card data 89 88 89
Health/genetic information 70 74 71
Exact location 71 65 59
Purchase history 50 53 43
Media usage/preference 44 43 37
Brand preference 24 21 17
1 Survey Question: “How private do you consider the following types of
personal?”
2 Result: Percentage(%) of respondents who consider the data type mod-
erately or extremely private
In other words, ω will not sell his/her own kth personal data
type with the price lower than Xk, but sell it otherwise.
Since each individual has their own personal opinions
regarding the value of personal data, a WTS function of the
kth personal data type is defined by the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of Xk (Φkpckq “ PtXk ď cku). To define the
WTS function, following two principles are applied. The first
is the more money offered, the more people accept to sell
their personal data. The second is privacy awareness of each
personal data type. Privacy awareness (denoted as ρ) means
that people consider private of personal data differently, so the
higher price is needed to buy the more private personal data.
Table II shows some parts of statistics from the survey [27],
which are related to privacy awareness of different personal
data types categorized by various age groups. It shows that
people have different privacy concerns depending on types of
personal data. For example, people think data of credit card
usage is more private than that of brand preferences. Finally,
the definition of the WTS function for the kth personal data
type is provided as following.
Definition 2 (Willingness-To-Sell (WTS) Function). The WTS
function Φk of the kth personal data type is defined by the
CDF of the limit selling price of the kth personal data type,
that is, Φkpckq “ PtXk ď cku, and given by,
Φkpckq “ 1´ e´ckρk . (1)
Figure 2 shows an empirical WTS as cumulative distribution
from [13] (Figure 2(a)) and the proposed WTS personal data
function curves with various privacy-awareness factors (ρ)
(Figure 2(b)). Note that the curves of WTS from the reference
and the proposed function are similar. WTS value reaches to
1.0 rapidly in less private case (with larger ρ) and reaches
slowly in more private case (with smaller ρ). The details to
decide proper ρ for each personal data type are discussed in
numerical analysis part (Section V).
B. Personal data quality model
Big-data analytics can be performed to extract new valuable
information from raw data using various techniques including
data mining, machine learning, etc. However, this paper does
not consider data analytic methods; this paper is interested in
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Fig. 2. Willingness-to-sell as a function of data price
quality of data analytic results. Thus, we define the quality
function Q to estimate improved personal data quality.
Quantifying the value and quality of personal data is an
important factor to decide price of personal data. We choose
several metrics to define the personal data quality function Q
based on [18]. By analyzing various privacy regulations and
researches, this work investigated privacy pricing factors as
follows: size of dataset, completeness of dataset, a number of
data types and their combinations, the level of identifiability
of personal data.
Based on previous works, we choose two principles for
personal data quality. The first is data quantity related to size
and completeness of dataset, which are also related to general
data quality measurements [35], [36]. More data equates
the high chance to estimate each individual correctly. Data
quantity is also related to accuracy for data processing. Several
studies showed that when the number of data increases, the
accuracy of machine learning analysis increases [20], [24],
[25].
The second is the correlation of personal data types (i.e.,
a number of personal data types and their combination,
5which are characteristics of personal data). Personal data types
with higher correlations have more valuable information to
data consumers. When personal data is combined with other
personal or identifiable information which is linked or linkable
to a specific individual, the data providers can potentially be
identified through additional processing of other attributes [37]
(the level of identifiability). Note that privacy awareness of
each personal data type is already considered in the WTS
function. Based on these principles, the definition of personal
data quality can be provided by the following definition.
Definition 3 (Personal data quality function). The personal
data quality function Q is defined by the quality of service
that can be provided by the personal dataset c “ pc1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , cKq
and given by,
Qpcq
“N
”
w1
! ÿ
iPK
Φipciqu ` w2
! ÿ
iPK
ÿ
jPK
i‰j
rij
b
ΦipciqΦjpcjq
)
`w3
! ÿ
iPK
ÿ
jPK
i‰j
ÿ
kPK
i‰j‰k
rijk
3
b
ΦipciqΦjpcjqΦkpckq
)
` ¨ ¨ ¨
ı
,
where w is the weight for each order term (
ř
wi “ 1) and r
is the correlation among personal data types (@r P r0, 1s).
To define the personal data quality function, the geometric
mean (root terms) is used to consider personal data relativity.
The personal data quality, which the data broker has, increases
when i) personal data types are tightly correlated, ii) the
amount of personal data is large, and iii) the amount of data for
each personal data type is balanced. Note that if w1 “ 1 and
w2 “ w3 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ 0, then it forms
ř
kPK 1´ e´ckρk which is
the same as data quality functions proposed in previous works
[20], [24], [25]. For simplicity, we consider the personal data
quality (Q) up to second order terms as follows:
Q “ N
ÿ
iPK
ÿ
jPK
rij
b
ΦipciqΦjpcjq. (2)
C. Willingness-to-buy of data consumers
Similar to the WTS function, a random variable about
candidates who may buy personal dataset should be provided
first in order to define the WTB function of personal data
consumers.
Definition 4 (Limit Buying Price of Data Consumer). Let τ
be an arbitrary candidate in GS who may buy personal dataset
form the data broker (τ P GS). A random variable Y , called
a limit buying price, is defined by the limit price at which τ
decides to buy the personal dataset from the data broker dB .
In other words, τ will not buy the service larger than the price
Y , but buy it otherwise.
Then, the WTB function Ψ of the data consumers is defined
by the CDF of the random variable Y defined as above, that
is, Ψppsq “ PtY ě psu.
It remains to model the WTB function rationally. We con-
sider basic economic principles for demand as follows: i) WTB
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Fig. 3. Willingness-to-buy function with personal data quality (Q)
decreases when data price increases, ii) data consumers prefer
to buy personal data with higher quality rather than that with
lower quality [17]. There are many ways to define the demand
curve depending on the price elasticity of demand (e.g., linear,
polynomial, exponential, etc.). From the assumptions, the
WTB function of personal data consumers is defined as an
exponential based function, given by the following definition.
Definition 5 (Willingness-To-Buy (WTB) Function). The
WTB function Ψ of the data consumers is defined by the CDF
of the limit buying price of the kth personal data type, that is,
Ψkppsq “ PtY ď psu, and given by,
Ψppsq “ e´ps{Q. (3)
Figure 3 shows the curves of the WTB function with respect
to various personal data quality Q. It basically decreases
when price of personal dataset increases, and it also rapidly
decreases with lower quality and slowly decreases with higher
quality, respectively.
IV. OPTIMAL PERSONAL DATA PRICING SCHEME
In this section, the data broker’s profit maximization prob-
lem is addressed from models for expected cost and revenue
of the data broker based on the proposed WTS and WTB
functions, respectively.
A. Expected cost and revenue
To define the profit function U , we consider the cost and
revenue of the data broker. As explained in the previous
section, personal data providers determine whether they sell
personal data or not based on their own WTS requirements.
The cost for buying one personal data type is ckΦkpckq, and
the cost for buying all personal data types is
ř
kPK ckΦkpckq.
If the number of the providers is N , then the total cost (E)
for buying personal data follows:
Epcq “ N
ÿ
kPK
ckΦkpckq. (4)
Similarly, personal data consumers buy personal data from the
data broker based on their WTB requirements. The revenue
6for selling personal dataset to one personal data consumer is
psΨppsq. If the number of the consumers is M , then the total
revenue (R) for selling personal dataset follows:
Rppsq “MpsΨppsq. (5)
B. Data broker profit function
Based on expected cost and revenue functions from equa-
tions (4) and (5), the profit function U of the data broker is
modeled as follows:
Upps, cq “ Rppsq ´ Epcq
“ MpsΨppsq ´N
ÿ
ckPc
ckΦkpckq
The profit of the data broker is the total revenue by selling
personal dataset minus the total cost by buying individuals’
personal data. In this paper, we assume that additional costs
for data processing, storage, and management are negligible.
Then, the profit maximization problem can be formulated as
follows:
P1 : max
ps,c
Upps, cq
such that U ą 0, N ą 0, M ą 0, (6)
ps ą 0, @ck P c ą 0, (7)
r P r0, 1s, ρ P r0, 1s. (8)
The condition (6) means a profit of the data broker should
be larger than zero to validate this problem, and the number
of data providers and consumers should be larger than zero.
Similarly, the cost for buying personal data c and the price for
selling personal data ps should be larger than zero (condition
(7)). The conditions for privacy awareness factors (ρ) and
personal data correlations (r) are explained in Sections III-A
and III-B, respectively (condition (8)).
C. Optimization
In this section, the profit optimization problem is solved. We
check that the existence of p˚s which maximizes the revenue
of the data broker when all ck P c are determined.
Theorem 1. The optimal price that maximizes the profit
function of the data broker is exactly the same as the personal
data quality, that is, p˚S “ Q.
Proof. It is checked that the revenue function is concave, thus
the maximum point can be obtained by checking the first order
derivative of the revenue function R becomes 0.
d
dps
R “ M re´ps{Q ` pste´ps{Q ´ 1
Q
us “ 0
ñ M re´ps{Qp1´ ps
Q
qs “ 0
ñ 1´ p
˚
s
Q
“ 0
ñ p˚s “ Q (9)
Since p˚s is also the function of c based on the equations
(2) and (9), the profit function Upp˚s , cq can be represented as
U˚pcq:
U˚pcq “ NMe´1
ÿ
iPK
ÿ
jPK
rij
b
ΦipciqΦjpcjq
´ N
ÿ
ckPc
ckΦkpckq.
Then, the optimization problem for the profit function (P1)
can be reduced as follows:
P1
˚
: max
ps,c
U˚pcq
such that U˚ ą 0, N ą 0, M ą 0, (10)
ps ą 0, @ck P c ą 0, (11)
r P r0, 1s, ρ P r0, 1s. (12)
We try to prove that U˚pcq is a concave function for all
ck P c with the analytical method by showing the second order
derivative of the function U˚pcq is negative. If the function
U˚pcq is concave, the profit function U˚ has the unique global
maximum point, which is the largest value of the function.
Checking convexity of multivariable functions can be done by
checking convexity of functions of one variable [38]. If we
take the second derivative of U˚pcq with respect to ck, then
we have
B2
Bc2k
U˚pcq “ Nckρ2ke´ckρk ´ 2Nρke´ckρk ,
´ NMe´1ρ2e´ckρkp1` A
σ
` Ae
´ckρk
2σ3{2
q
where A “ řiPK,i‰k?1´ e´ciρi and σ “ ?1´ e´ckρk .
Unfortunately, it is hard to confirm the concaveness of the
function U˚ based on the result of second derivative, so we
empirically check that the function U˚ is concave with all ck
that make the U˚ value positive with conditions from (10) to
(12). Detailed graphs are described in Section V.
D. MGA algorithm
The gradient ascent method is a well-known method to find
the maximum point of a concave function, which iteratively
takes steps proportional to the positive of the gradient. Since
the concave function U˚ has a k number of variables, we
can apply the multivariate gradient ascent (MGA) algorithm
as shown in Algorithm 1.
For the MGA algorithm to find the maximum point of
the profit function U˚, first, this algorithm gets basic input
parameters: the number of data providers (N ), data consumers
(M ), personal data types (K), and privacy awareness factors
(ρ). And then, it initializes several variables. The variable i,
the number of iteration, is set to zero. The ǫ, threshold for
the ending iteration, is set to 0.00001. If ǫ is small enough,
the algorithm has a higher chance to find the global maximum
point, however, if the ǫ is too small, the algorithm needs too
many iterations to reach the maximum point. h is the constant
to calculate the first order derivative based on the definition.
h needs to be small enough to find the proper gradient at
7Algorithm 1 Multivariate Gradient Ascent (MGA)
Input:
N : the number of data providers
M : the number of data consumers
K: the number of data types
ρ: the privacy-awareness factor
Initialization:
(a) The number of iteration i “ 0
(b) The threshold for the ending iteration ǫ “ 0.00001
(c) The constant for derivative h “ 0.000001
(d-1) Allocate cost c0 “ tck| ck “ h, @k P Ku
(d-2) Calculate the expected profit U˚
0
at c0
(e) The step size δ “ 1{minpN,Mq
Start algorithm:
do
(1) i “ i` 1
(2) Find derivative of U˚: ∇U˚pciq
which means
B
Bck
U˚pciq “ U
˚pci`hq´U
˚pci´hq
2h
,@ck, k P K
(3) ci “ ci´1 ` δ∇U˚pciq
(4) U˚i “ U˚pciq
while
 |U˚i ´ U˚i´1| ă ǫ(
Output:
c: a set of allocated cost to buy each data types
U˚: the maximum profit value
the given point ci. Then, it initializes the starting point c0 as
th, h, ..., hu and calculates the expected profit U˚ at c0. We
set c0 with the value of h (i.e., very small value) because c
should have non-zero values from the condition (11).
Next, it decides the step size of each iteration. The step size
δ is the most important factor of this MGA algorithm because
it can only reach the proper optimal point with the proper
step size. Any positive value can be selected for the step size;
however, it is very difficult to choose an arbitrary value for
the fixed step size because the U˚pcq is convex if and only
if it satisfies conditions from (10) to (12). If this algorithm
chooses a wrong step size value, there is a chance to violate
the conditions during iterations. Therefore, to choose δ, we
check the first order derivative of the profit function (U˚) as
follows:
BU˚pcq
Bck
“ Npe´ckρ ´ 1q ´Nckρe´ckρ `NMe´1ρe´ckρp1` Aσk q
where A “ řiPK,i‰k?1´ e´ciρi and σk “ ?1´ e´ckρk . It
shows that both N and M are related to BBckU
˚pcq. Based
on the experiment, this algorithm chooses δ as 1
minpN,Mq .
The detailed analysis about the step size δ including time
complexity (i.e., the number of iterations for various cases)
is shown in Table IV.
After the initialization, the algorithm starts to find the max-
imum point. First, it increases the number of iteration (i) (step
1), and then finds the first order derivative of the profit function
(U˚) for @ck P c (step 2). To check the first order derivative,
this algorithm uses ∇U˚pciq “ U
˚pci`hq´U
˚pci´hq
2h
. Then,
the algorithm updates the new cost point (ci) by finding the
slope of the function (δ∇U˚pciq) at the previous cost point
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Data cost (c)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Pr
of
it 
(U
)
104
=0.0198 (more private)
=0.0333
=0.0389
=0.0762
=0.1175
=0.1359 (less private)
MAX at (16.0, 5.103)
MAX at (17.3, 4.891)
MAX at (21.1, 4.196)
MAX at (27.8, 2.764)
MAX at (30.9, 1.953)
MAX at (26.7, 3.029)
Fig. 4. Profit values of the data broker with single personal data type w.r.t
privacy awareness factors (ρ)
(ci´1) (step 3). Finally, it calculates the new profit value (U
˚
i )
in the newly updated cost point (ci) (step 4). If the difference
between the new profit value (U˚i ) and the previous profit value
(U˚i´1) is less then ǫ, then the algorithm stops and returns the
allocated cost (c) and the maximum profit (U˚), otherwise it
goes to step 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS WITH KAGGLE SMS DATASET
This section analyzes the proposed personal data trading
model using both theoretical and empirical approaches. More-
over, by using 3-dimensional graphs, we will verify visually
whether the optimal point of the profit maximization problem
with multiple cost variables is correct.
In order to analyze the proposed personal data trading
model, we configure parameters N,M, ρ, and r as follows:
‚ Since the N affects only the size of the resulting values,
there are relatively few restrictions on the parameter
selection. Thus, we just set the number of data providers
N “ 1000. For the number of data consumer M , we
choose a reasonable number as M “ 200 to valid the
profit maximization problem.
‚ For privacy awareness factors in the proposed WTS
function, we choose six (K “ 6) personal data types (i.e.,
health condition ($35.0), payment details: credit cards
($20.8), purchase histories ($17.8), hobbies, tastes &
preferences ($9.1), photos & videos ($5.9), and physical
location: GPS ($5.1)) based on the real-world survey
in [10] which introduces the average prices for each
personal data type. We find each ρ that makes WTS
value 0.5 with the proposed price for each personal
data type from the survey. Then, each ρk is decided
as ρ “ t0.0198, 0.0333, 0.0389, 0.0762, 0.1175, 0.1359u,
respectively. Note that the smaller ρ means more private
and the larger ρ means less private.
‚ For the personal data quality function, correlations be-
tween two different personal data types r is randomly
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chosen in the range of [0, 1] (i.e., r P r0, 1s) with uniform
distribution unless conditions are separately mentioned.
‚ For the cost value c, it represents the vector for cost of
each personal data type as c “ pc1, c2, ..., ckq.
First, we check the optimal values with a single personal
data type (K “ 1) and with two different personal data types
(K “ 2), and then we check the optimal values with various
numbers of personal data types (K ě 3). The results of the
proposed algorithm (MGA) and the global optimum are also
discussed. Moreover, we also show that how the average profit
of the data broker changes with respect to the number of
personal data providers and consumers.
A. Theoretical Experiment
This section checks the optimal values with a single per-
sonal data type (K “ 1) and with two different personal data
types (K “ 2). Figure 4 shows the data broker’s profit function
U˚ with the single data type (K “ 1) with various privacy
awareness factors (ρ) with the same personal data correlation
factor (rii “ 1,@i P K). We can see the U˚pcq is a concave
function for all variables (N,M, ρ, r), and has the globally
unique maximum value for each ρ. The maximum values are
follows:$’&
’%
ρ “ t0.0198u : 1.953ˆ 104 at c “ p30.9q,
ρ “ t0.0762u : 4.196ˆ 104 at c “ p21.1q,
ρ “ t0.1359u : 5.103ˆ 104 at c “ p16.0q.
The profit value of larger ρ (i.e., less private personal data) is
higher than that of smaller ρ (i.e., more private personal data)
because the number of participants for selling data is different.
A unit price for more private personal data is larger than less
private personal data, however, it is hard to collect more private
personal data because WTS of that is lower. It means the data
broker spends much money to buy enough amount of more
private ones. As a result, the amount of personal data collected
is different; that is, the personal data quality is different, and
it is directly applied to the profit value.
Next, we verify the profit values when the data broker han-
dles two different personal data types (K “ 2). Figure 5 shows
the data broker’s profit function U˚ with the combination of
two different privacy awareness factors (ρ) and personal data
correlation constants (r) as follows:
rij “
#
1 if i “ j
0.5 if i ‰ j.
It shows various results with different combinations of per-
sonal data types. The maximum profits are follows:$’&
’%
ρ “ t0.0333, 0.0198u : 6.772ˆ 104 at c “ p32.2, 37.8q,
ρ “ t0.0762, 0.0198u : 8.496ˆ 104 at c “ p23.4, 38.6q,
ρ “ t0.1359, 0.0198u : 9.518ˆ 104 at c “ p17.3, 38.9q.
The profit increases when the data broker sells the combination
of less private data and more private data. When the profit
9TABLE III
THE COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED MGA AND THE GLOBAL OPTIMUM
K Privacy awareness (ρ) UMGA cMGA UOptimal cOptimal
1 {0.0198} 19530.07 (30.92) 19530.07 (30.92)
2 {0.0198, 0.0333} 67723.11 (37.83, 32.23) 67723.11 (37.83, 32.23)
3 {0.0198, 0.0333, 0.0389} 146307.14 (44.11, 36.81, 34.64) 146307.14 (44.11, 36.81, 34.64)
4 {0.0198, 0.0333, 0.0389, 0.0762} 272946.37 (50.10, 41.13, 38.50, 27.75) 272946.37 (50.10, 41.13, 38.50, 27.75)
5 {0.0198, 0.0333, 0.0389, 444853.69 (55.53, 44.98, 41.94, - -
0.0762, 0.1175} 29.70, 22.97)
6 {0.0198, 0.0333, 0.0389, 656452.48 (60.45, 48.42, 44.99, - -
0.0762, 0.1175, 0.1359} 31.41, 24.11, 21.94)
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Fig. 7. The average profit of the data broker with respect to the number of market participants
increases, the cost for buying the same data also increases
(see c2 with ρ “ 0.0198 in c “ pc1, c2q).
Note that the profit with two different personal data types is
higher than that with a single personal data type (comparing
Figure 4 and 5(a)) as follows:$’&
’%
ρ “ t0.0198u : 1.953ˆ 104 at c “ p30.9q,
ρ “ t0.1359u : 5.103ˆ 104 at c “ p16.0q.
ρ “ t0.1359, 0.0198u : 9.518ˆ 104 at c “ p17.3, 38.9q.
If the data broker handles each personal data type separately,
the profit is 7.056 ˆ 104 at c “ p16.0, 30.9q; however, if
the data broker handles two data types together, the profit is
9.518 ˆ 104 at c “ p17.3, 38.9q because the personal data
quality of combined dataset is more higher.
We also verify the profit value with different personal data
correlations r. Figure 6 shows the data broker’s profit value
(U˚) for the combination of two personal data types (ρ “
0.0198, 0.0333) with different personal data correlation values
(rij “ 1 if i “ j and rij “ t0.3, 0.6, 0.9u if i ‰ j). The
maximum profits are follows:$’&
’%
r12 “ 0.3 : 5.923ˆ 104 at c “ p30.5, 35.2q,
r12 “ 0.6 : 7.210ˆ 104 at c “ p33.1, 39.1q,
r12 “ 0.9 : 8.567ˆ 104 at c “ p35.6, 42.8q.
It shows that higher personal data correlation makes higher
profit because the personal data quality increases when the per-
sonal data correlation increases. Similar to Figure 5, personal
data costs (c1 and c2) also increase when the profit increases.
B. Experiment: Kaggle SMS Dataset
In the previous section, we have checked that the proposed
personal data trading model is well defined, and the optimiza-
tion problem is truly and globally optimized for the profit
maximization problem. From now on, we check the validity
of the proposed MGA algorithm (Algorithm 1 in Section IV-D)
with various numbers of personal data types (K ě 3q using a
real-world dataset from Kaggle [39], which is the public data
platform for data-science, to implement the proposed MGA
algorithm.
The data are short message service (SMS) texts with various
personal data from mobile phones, which consist of 42,000
messages from year 2010 to 2017. These data are categorized
into 12 different types including payment, reservation, medical
appointment, delivery, etc. From these data, we choose 6
different personal data types used in the previous section
(i.e., ρ “ t0.0198, 0.0333, 0.0389, 0.0762, 0.1175, 0.1359u)
and select N number of SMS text data for each personal data
type. We assume that this dataset collected from N number of
data providers andM number of the data consumers try to buy
personal dataset because this paper assumes the subscription
based personal data trading model as explained in Section III.
Table III shows that the comparison of the proposed MGA
and the global optimum for profit values of the data broker
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TABLE IV
THE STEP SIZE AND TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS FOR THE MGA ALGORITHM
N M K UMGA step size δ # of iter. N M K UMGA step size δ # of iter.
1000 200 6 - ă 1/50 Not applicable 1000 200 3 146307.14 (1/N, 1/M) (331, 67)
1000 200 6 656452.48 1/100 37 1000 200 4 272946.37 (1/N, 1/M) (338, 69)
1000 200 6 656452.48 1/M 71 1000 200 5 444853.69 (1/N, 1/M) (346, 70)
1000 200 6 656452.48 1/N 353 1000 400 6 1546256.61 (1/N, 1/M) (415, 170)
1000 200 6 656452.48 1/10000 3172 2000 400 6 3092513.22 (1/N, 1/M) (429, 84)
4000 400 6 - 1/100 Not applicable 4000 400 6 6185026.45 (1/N, 1/M) (440, 57)
4000 800 6 - 1/100 Not applicable 4000 800 6 13717067.41 (1/N, 1/M) (489, 108)
4000 8000 6 - 1/100 Not applicable 4000 8000 6 155439207.62 (1/N, 1/M) (739, 983)
using the dataset. Note that cases of K “ 5 and K “ 6
for the global optimum are not obtained because it takes too
much time for finding optimal points with large K. From K “
1 to 4, the results of the proposed MGA and that of the global
optimum are same. It shows that the proposed MGA algorithm
is properly designed.
Next, using the proposed MGA algorithm, we calculate the
average profit values of the data broker with respect to the
number of data consumers and data providers as shown in
Figure 7. To obtain average values, we simulate 10,000 times
for each case with uniformly distributed random values r P
r0, 1s and ρ P r0.01, 0.2s (i.e., the average data price ck that
makes WTS value 0.5 within ck P r3, 70s) for each personal
data type in the dataset.
First, we check the profit of the data broker with different
number of data consumers (M ) as shown in Figure 7(a). It
shows that as the number of data consumer increases, the
average profit also increases. Note that the average profit
increases rapidly when the number of personal data types
increases because the personal data quality becomes higher
which is directly related to revenue. Similarly, we also check
the profit with different number of data providers (N ) as shown
in Figure 7(b). Since the number of data providers is related
with both expected revenue and cost as described in Section
IV-A, the profit slowly increases.
At last, we analyze the performance of the proposed MGA
algorithm with respect to various parameters including the step
size δ and input parameters N , M , and K as shown in Table
IV. The left side of the table shows the results of the MGA
algorithm with respect to various step sizes. If the step size is
large enough, it can reach the optimal point very fast (i.e., less
than 40 iterations with the step size 1{100); however, it may
not be proper to find the optimal point if the step size is too
large. As shown in the bottom of the left side of the table, the
fixed step size with an arbitrary value may not be applicable
to some cases. Consequently, we need to choose either 1{N
or 1{M as the step size of the algorithm for robustness and
stability, so the proposed MGA algorithm chooses the step
size as δ “ 1{minpN,Mq. The right side of the table shows
the results of the proposed algorithm with the step size 1{N
or 1{M with different cases. Both 1{N and 1{M can find
the same optimal point (UMGA), but the required number of
iterations is different.
VI. PRACTICAL INSIGHTS
In this section, we discusses the detailed feasibility of the
proposed personal data trading model for real-world applica-
tions.
As introduced in the beginning of this paper, the personal
data brokering market has been continuously growing, and
data brokers make a huge amount of money with the personal
data analytic; but many personal data providers think that the
current ecosystem is not trustworthy due to little transparency
and individual’s empowerment for personal data usage. Many
literature surveys have identified the trust gap between per-
sonal data brokers/consumers and providers [6], [7], [40], and
one of the major items to improve trust of the personal data
ecosystem is the empowerment of personal data providers.
Since new regulations and legislation with strengthening the
rights of personal data providers for the personal data ecosys-
tem were introduced and already applied to the real-world
[40]–[42], it is necessary for data brokers to accept a new
paradigm about empowering providers. However, these new
regulations become obstacles for conventional data brokers’
business. A typical example is the European General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which affects personal data
exploitation and hugely impacts on personal data brokering
businesses [40]–[46]. One of the major articles related to
data brokers in GDPR is conditions for consent (Article 7).
Before GDPR enforcement, data brokers were able to collect
and process personal data with opt-in based agreement with
long illegible terms and conditions. However, data brokers
now can collect personal data only after acquiring consent
from individuals by specifying the purpose of personal data
processing. For example, if the personal data provider refuses
to use his/her personal data for other purposes rather than
the original purpose, the personal data cannot be used even
though it is collected and used for the original purpose. Now,
data brokers must consider how to acquire the consent from
personal data providers for their businesses.
There are many possible ways to increase the possibility
for market participation of personal data providers; and in this
paper, we have focused on a possible approach with personal
data providers’ incentives. Since personal data now become
a new financial asset for individuals [10], this approach also
has investigated in previous works [18], [28], [33]. However, it
was still ambiguous about the feasibility of the IoT data market
with personal data providers’ incentives; in other words, how
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is possible to maintain the current IoT data market structure
by satisfying stakeholders (i.e., providers, consumers, and
especially brokers) because the previous studies did not jointly
consider major stakeholders in the market. In this paper, with
some numerical and experimental analysis in Section V, we
have shown that the proposed personal data trading model
is feasible for brokers as well as providers/consumers while
satisfying their requirements (i.e., profit maximization, WTS,
and WTB, respectively).
The proposed trading model will have positive effects for
stakeholders by invigorating the personal data ecosystem.
Personal data providers will be more inclined to provide
their personal data. So far, IoT data markets have not been
well-formed due to the lack of transparency. However, if the
proposed trading model is applied, each individual may feel
comfortable to provide their personal data at a fair value.
Personal data consumers do not need to spend budget on
unnecessary personal dataset to meet the desired purpose and
quality requirements.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel personal data
trading model that consists of personal data providers, a
data broker, and personal data consumers while considering
heterogeneous personal data types. We have designed the
realistic WTS and WTB personal data functions based on the
literature, so the expected number of providers and consumers
are obtained practically. We also have designed the personal
data quality model taking into consideration multiple types of
personal data. The analytic results have demonstrated that the
proposed approach is guaranteed to find a global maximum
point for the profit function of the data broker, and it is
feasible to the current IoT data marketplaces. As a future work,
multiple personal data stores and multiple data brokers can be
considered to extend the proposed trading model. In addition,
various cost models for data computing and storage can be
considered [28]. Moreover, an auditable ledger technique,
which is able to record personal data transactions among the
market stakeholders [47], can also be applied to design a
personal data trading model more realistically.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Perera, C. H. Liu, and S. Jayawardena, “The emerging internet of
things marketplace from an industrial perspective: A survey,” IEEE
Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 585–
598, Dec 2015.
[2] E. Ramirez and et al., Data brokers: A call for transparency and
Accountability. Federal Trade Commission, 2014.
[3] A. Rieke, H. Yu, D. Robinson, and J. von Hoboken, Data
brokers in an open society. Upturn and Open Society Foundations,
2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
reports/data-brokers-open-society
[4] A. Roosendaal, M. van Lieshout, and A. F. van Veenstra,
Personal data markets. Earth, Life & Social Sciences, 2014.
[Online]. Available: https://publications.tno.nl/publication/34612412/
riZsP9/TNO-2014-R11390.pdf
[5] S. Spiekermann, R. Bo¨hme, A. Acquisti, and K. L. Hui, “Personal data
markets,” Electronic Markets, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 91–93, 2015.
[6] W. E. Forum and A. Kearney, Rethinking Personal Data: A New Lens
for Strengthening Trust. World Economic Forum, 2014. [Online].
Available: https://www.weforum.org/reports/rethinking-personal-data
[7] A. L. John Rose and E. Baltassis, Bridging the Trust Gap in Personal
Data. Boston Consulting Group, 2018.
[8] S. Schudy and V. Utikal, “you must not know about meon the
willingness to share personal data,” Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, vol. 141, pp. 1 – 13, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117301580
[9] W. Bizon and A. Poszewiecki, “The Willingness to Trade Privacy in the
Context of WTA and WTP,” International Journal of Trade, Economics
and Finance, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 121–124, 2016.
[10] Ponemon Institute, Privacy and Security in a Connected Life : A Study
of US. Trend Micro and Ponemon Institute, 2015.
[11] Global GFK Survey, Willingness to share per-
sonal data in exchange for benefits or rewards.
Gesellschaft fu¨r Konsumforschung, 2017. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.gfk.com/fileadmin/user upload/country one pager/
NL/images/Global-GfK onderzoek - delen van persoonlijke data.pdf
[12] J. Grossklags and A. Acquisti, “When 25 Cents is too much : An
Experiment on Willingness-To-Sell and Willingness-To-Protect Personal
Information,” Proceedings of Sixth Workshop on the Economics of
Information Security (WEIS 2007), pp. 1–22, 2007.
[13] V. Benndorf and H.-T. Normann, “The willingness to sell personal
data,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 120, no. 4, pp.
1260–1278, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/abs/10.1111/sjoe.12247
[14] S.-A. Elvy, “Paying for privacy and the personal data economy,”
Columbia Law Review, vol. 117, no. 6, pp. 1369–1459, 2017. [Online].
Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/44392955
[15] D. Kifer, “Privacy and the price of data,” in 2015 30th Annual
ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, July 2015, pp.
16–16.
[16] S. Spiekermann and J. Korunovska, “Towards a value theory for
personal data,” Journal of Information Technology, vol. 32, no. 1, pp.
62–84, Mar 2017. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2016.4
[17] L. Rittenberg and T. Tregarthen, Principles of Economics. FlatWorld,
2014.
[18] G. Malgieri and B. Custers, “Pricing privacy the right to know the value
of your personal data,” Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 34, no. 2,
pp. 289 – 303, 2018.
[19] F. Liang, W. Yu, D. An, Q. Yang, X. Fu, and W. Zhao, “A Survey on
Big Data Market: Pricing, Trading and Protection,” IEEE Access, vol. 6,
pp. 15 132–15 154, 2018.
[20] D. Niyato, M. A. Alsheikh, P. Wang, D. I. Kim, and Z. Han, “Market
model and optimal pricing scheme of big data and Internet of Things
(IoT),” 2016 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC
2016, pp. 1–6, 2016.
[21] Y. Zhao, Y. Yu, Y. Li, G. Han, and X. Du, “Machine learning based
privacy-preserving fair data trading in big data market,” Information
Sciences, vol. 478, pp. 449 – 460, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020025518309174
[22] J. Yu, M. H. Cheung, J. Huang, and H. V. Poor, “Mobile data trading:
Behavioral economics analysis and algorithm design,” IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 994–1005, April
2017.
[23] A. E. Al-Fagih, F. M. Al-Turjman, W. M. Alsalih, and H. S. Hassanein,
“A priced public sensing framework for heterogeneous iot architectures,”
IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.
133–147, June 2013.
[24] B. Jang, S. Park, J. Lee, and S. G. Hahn, “Three hierarchical levels of
big-data market model over multiple data sources for internet of things,”
IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 31 269–31 280, 2018.
[25] Y. Jiao, P. Wang, S. Feng, and D. Niyato, “Profit maximization mecha-
nism and data management for data analytics services,” IEEE Internet
of Things Journal, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 2001–2014, June 2018.
[26] Y. Hui, Z. Su, and S. Guo, “Utility based data computing scheme to
provide sensing service in internet of things,” IEEE Transactions on
Emerging Topics in Computing, pp. 1–1, 2018.
[27] R. S. John Rose, Christine Barton and J. Platt, The Trust Adventage:
How to Win with Big Data. Boston Consulting Group, 2013.
[28] X.-B. Li and S. Raghunathan, “Pricing and disseminating customer
data with privacy awareness,” Decision Support Systems, vol. 59, pp. 63
– 73, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0167923613002534
[29] V. Gkatzelis, C. Aperjis, and B. A. Huberman, “Pricing private data,”
Electronic Markets, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 109–123, 2015.
[30] Y. Shen, B. Guo, Y. Shen, X. Duan, X. Dong, and H. Zhang, “A pricing
model for Big Personal Data,” Tsinghua Science and Technology, vol. 21,
no. 5, pp. 482–490, 2016.
12
[31] L. Xu, C. Jiang, Y. Qian, Y. Zhao, J. Li, and Y. Ren, “Dynamic privacy
pricing: A multi-armed bandit approach with time-variant rewards,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 12, no. 2,
pp. 271–285, 2017.
[32] X. Wang, X. Wei, Y. Liu, and S. Gao, “On pricing approximate queries,”
Information Sciences, vol. 453, pp. 198 – 215, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020025518302901
[33] J. Parra-Arnau, “Optimized, direct sale of privacy in personal data
marketplaces,” Information Sciences, vol. 424, pp. 354 – 384,
2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0020025517310022
[34] Z. Su, Q. Qi, Q. Xu, S. Guo, and X. Wang, “Incentive scheme for cyber
physical social systems based on user behaviors,” IEEE Transactions on
Emerging Topics in Computing, pp. 1–1, 2018.
[35] N. Askham and et al., The six primary dimensions for data quality
assessment. DAMA UK Working Group, 2013.
[36] C. Batini, M. Palmonari, and G. Viscusi, Opening the Closed
World: A Survey of Information Quality Research in the Wild.
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07121-3 4
[37] W. E. Forum and B. C. Group, Unlocking the Value of Personal Data:
From Collection to Usage. World Economic Forum, 2013.
[38] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[39] H. Sain, data sms. Kaggle, 2017. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.kaggle.com/moose9200/data-sms
[40] P. Hacker and B. Petkova, “Reining in the big promise of big data:
Transparency, inequality, and new regulatory frontiers,” Northwestern
Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1 –
47, 2017.
[41] C.-L. Yeh, “Pursuing consumer empowerment in the age of big
data: A comprehensive regulatory framework for data brokers,”
Telecommunications Policy, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 282 – 292,
2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0308596117304743
[42] M. Oostveen and K. Irion, “The golden age of personal data: How to
regulate an enabling fundamental right?” Personal Data in Competition,
Consumer Protection and Intellectual Property Law & MPI Studies on
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol. 28, pp. 7 – 26, 2018.
[43] V. Janeek, “Ownership of personal data in the internet of things,”
Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 1039 – 1052,
2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0267364918300487
[44] N. Duch-Brown, B. Martens, and F. Mueller-Langer, The Economics
of Ownership, Access and Trade in Digital Data. JRC Digital
Economy Working Paper 2017-01, 2017. [Online]. Available: https:
//ssrn.com/abstract=2914144
[45] D. O. Harshvardhan J. Pandit, Plamen Petkov and D. Lewis, Investigat-
ing Conditional Data Value Under GDPR. SEMANTiCS2018 - 14th
Interational Conference on Semantic Systems, 2018.
[46] A. Katwala, Forget Facebook, mysterious data brokers are facing
GDPR trouble. Wired, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.wired.
co.uk/article/gdpr-acxiom-experian-privacy-international-data-brokers
[47] E. Kokoris-Kogias, E. C. Alp, S. D. Siby, N. Gailly, L. Gasser,
P. Jovanovic, E. Syta, and B. Ford, “Calypso: Auditable sharing of
private data over blockchains,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2018/209, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/209
Hyeontaek Oh is currently a Ph.D. student in
School of Electrical Engineering, Korea Advanced
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). He
received his B.S. degree in computer science and
M.S. degree in electrical engineering from KAIST in
2012 and 2014, respectively. His research interests
in trust in ICT environments, personal data ecosys-
tem, Internet of Things (IoT), and Web technolo-
gies. He has actively participated in several national
funded research projects for ICT environment as a
research assistant. He also has contributed Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector
Study Group 13/20 as contributors and editors since 2015.
Sangdon Park is currently Brain Plus 21 Postdoc-
toral Researcher in the Information and Electronics
Research Institute at Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology (KAIST), Daejeon, Repub-
lic of Korea,. He received the B.S., M.S. and Ph.D.
degrees in KAIST in 2011, 2013, and 2017, re-
spectively. He has contributed several articles to the
International Telecommunication Union Telecom-
munication (ITU-T). He received a Best Student
Paper Award at the 11th International Conference
on Queueing Theory and Network Applications in
2016. His current research interests lie in optimizing wireless networks or
smart grids, which hold great potential for practical applications to industries
and he has focused on processing energy big data via various machine-
learning methodologies and optimizing network economics of the edge cloud
computing.
Gyu Myoung Lee received his BS degree from
Hong Ik University, Seoul, Korea, in 1999 and his
MS and PhD degrees from the Korea Advanced
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), Dae-
jeon, Korea, in 2000 and 2007. He is with the
Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU), UK, as
Reader from 2014 and with KAIST Institute for
IT convergence, Korea, as Adjunct Professor from
2012. Prior to joining the LJMU, he has worked
with the Institut Mines-Telecom, Telecom SudParis,
France, from 2008. Until 2012, he had been invited
to work with the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
(ETRI), Korea. He also worked as a research professor in KAIST, Korea
and as a guest researcher in National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), USA, in 2007. His research interests include Internet of things, future
networks, multimedia services, and energy saving technologies including
smart grids. He has been actively working for standardization in ITU-T, IETF
and oneM2M, etc. In ITU-T, he currently serves as a WP chair in SG13, the
Rapporteur of Q16/13 and Q4/20 as well as the chair of FG-DPM. He is a
Senior Member of IEEE.
Hwanjo Heo received his BS degree in electrical en-
gineering from Korea University, Seoul, Rep. of Ko-
rea, in 2004 and his MS degree in computer science
from Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA, in
2009. He is currently a senior researcher at ETRI and
also pursuing his Ph. D. at Korea Advanced Institute
of Science and Technology (KAIST), Daejeon, Rep.
of Korea. His research interests include network
security, network measurement, and distributed sys-
tems.
Jun Kyun Choi received the B.Sc. (Eng.) from
Seoul National University in electronics engineering,
Seoul, Korea in 1982, and M.Sc. (Eng.) and Ph.D.
degree in 1985 and 1988, respectively, in electron-
ics engineering from Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology (KAIST). From June 1986
until December 1997, he was with the Electronics
and Telecommunication Research Institute (ETRI).
In January 1998, he joined the Information and
Communications University (ICU), Daejeon, Korea
as Professor. At the year of 2009, he moved to Korea
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) as Professor. He is a
Senior Member of IEEE, the executive member of The Institute of Electronics
Engineers of Korea (IEEK), Editor Board of Member of Korea Information
Processing Society (KIPS), Life member of Korea Institute of Communication
Science (KICS).
